



Jennifer A. McMahon 
Beauty 




Copyright © 2020. All rights reserved. 
 
 
Originally published at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/OBO/9780195396577-0038 
 


























After publication you may reuse the following portions of your content without obtaining formal permission for the 
activities expressly listed below:  
 one chapter or up to 10% of the total of your single author or co-authored book,  
 a maximum of one chapter/article from your contribution to an edited book or collection (e.g. Oxford 
Handbooks),  
 a maximum of one chapter/article of your contribution to an online only, or digital original publication, or  
 three figures/illustrations/tables of your own original work  
OUP is pleased to grant this permission for the following uses:  
 posting on your own personal website or in an institutional or subject based repository after a 12 month 
period for Science and Medical titles and a 24 month period for Academic, Trade and Reference titles;  
 inclusion in scholarly, not-for-profit derivative reuses, (these can include the extension of your contribution 
to a book-length work, or inclusion in an edited collection of your own work, or any work of which you are 
an author or editor);  
 reproduction within coursepacks or e-coursepacks for your own teaching purposes, (with the proviso that 
the coursepacks are not sold for more than the cost of reproduction);  
 inclusion within your thesis or dissertation.  
 
 
4 August 2021 
McMahon, Jennifer A.. “Beauty.” In Oxford Bibliographies in Philosophy. Ed. Duncan 
Pritchard. New York: Oxford University Press, 29/08/2012, updated 1/08/2019, 




Jennifer A. McMahon 
 
Introduction 
Anthologies and Reference Works 
Beauty Analyzed 
 The Sensuous and Desire 
 Standards 
Beauty and Art 
Beauty and Disinterest 




 Beauty and Evaluation 
 Beauty and Aesthetic Form 
 Beauty and Autonomy 
 Beauty and the Form of Perfection 
Beauty Judged 
 Aesthetic Judgment and Community 
Beauty Motivated 
 Beauty and Truth 
 Beauty and Value Theory 




Philosophical interest in beauty began with the earliest recorded philosophers. Beauty was 
deemed to be an essential ingredient in a good life and so what it was, where it was to be found, 
and how it was to be included in a life were prime considerations. The way beauty has been 
conceived has been influenced by an author’s other philosophical commitments―metaphysical, 
epistemological, and ethical―and such commitments reflect the historical and cultural position 
of the author. For example, beauty is a manifestation of the divine on earth to which we respond 
with love and adoration; beauty is a harmony of the soul that we achieve through cultivating 
feeling in a rational and tempered way; beauty is an idea raised in us by certain objective 
features of the world; beauty is a sentiment that can nonetheless be cultivated to be appropriate 
to its object; beauty is the object of a judgment by which we exercise the social, comparative, 
and intersubjective elements of cognition, and so on. Such views on beauty not only reveal 
underlying philosophical commitments but also reflect positive contributions to understanding 
the nature of value and the relation between mind and world. One way to distinguish between 
beauty theories is according to the conception of the human being that they assume or imply, for 
example, where they fall on the continuum from determinism to free will, ungrounded notions of 
compatibilism notwithstanding. For example, theories at the latter end might carve out a sense of 
genuine innovation and creativity in human endeavors while at the other end of the spectrum 
authors may conceive of beauty as an environmental trigger for consumption, procreation, or 
preservation in the interests of the individual. Treating beauty experiences as in some respect 
intentional, characterizes beauty theory prior to the 20th century and since, mainly in historically 
inspired writing on beauty. However, treating beauty as affect or sensation has always had its 
representatives and is most visible today in evolutionary-inspired accounts of beauty (though not 
all evolutionary accounts fit this classification). Beauty theory falls under some combination of 
metaphysics, epistemology, meta-ethics, aesthetics, and psychology. Although during the 20th 
century beauty was more likely to be conceived as an evaluative concept for art, recent 
philosophical interest in beauty can again be seen to exercise arguments pertaining to 
metaphysics, epistemology, meta-ethics, philosophy of meaning, and language in addition to 
philosophy of art and environmental aesthetics. This work has been funded by an Australian 
Research Council Grant: DP150103143  (Taste and Community). 
 
Anthologies and Reference Works 
Anthologies on beauty that bring together writers who, while they may discuss art, do so in the 
main only to reveal our capacity for beauty, include the excellent selection of historical readings 
collected in the one-volume Hofstadter and Kuhns 1976 and the more culturally inclusive 
collection Cooper 1997. Recent anthologies on beauty can take the form of a study of aesthetic 
value, such as in Schaper 1983, or more specifically on the ethical dimension of aesthetic value, 
such as in Hagberg 2008. Reference works in philosophical aesthetics today tend to focus on the 
philosophy of art and criticism. They typically include one chapter on beauty, and in this context 
Mothersill 2004 treats beauty as an evaluative category for art; and in keeping with this 
approach, Mothersill 2009 recommends a historically informed understanding of the concept 
beauty derived from Hegel. A recent trend toward environmental aesthetics brings us back to 
beauty as a property of the natural world, as in Zangwill 2003, while McMahon 2005 responds 
to empirical trends by treating beauty as a value compatible with naturalization. The 
comprehensive entry **Beauty** in the Oxford Encyclopedia of Aesthetics is divided into four 
parts. It begins with Stephen David Ross’s brief but excellent summary of the history of 
concepts that underpin beauty theory and philosophical aesthetics more broadly. It is followed 
by Nickolas Pappas’s dedicated section on classical concepts of beauty, and then Jan A. 
Aertsen’s section on medieval concepts of beauty. The entry concludes with Nicholas Riggle’s 
discussion of beauty and love, which introduces contemporary themes to the topic. Guyer 2014 
analyses historical trends in approaches to beauty theory in a way which sets up illuminating 
contrasts to contemporary perspectives. 
 
Cooper, David. Aesthetics: The Classic Readings. Oxford and Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1997. 
Introductions are provided to some of the classic readings on beauty followed by an extract from 
the relevant work. They are discussed in terms of their relevance to understanding art rather than 
value more generally. 
 
Guyer, Paul. A History of Modern Aesthetics Vol.1-3. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2014. 
Guyer traces the development of key concepts in aesthetics, including beauty, within a context 
of broader scaled trends, such as aesthetics of truth in the ancient world, aesthetics of emotion 
and imagination in the eighteenth century; and aesthetics of meaning and significance in the 
twentieth.  
 
Hagberg, Garry I., ed. Art and Ethical Criticism. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2008. 
A series of papers on the ethical dimension of art, the authors draw out the ethical significance 
of a particular art/literary/musical work or art form. It is worth noting that the lead essay by Paul 
Guyer argues that 18th-century writers on beauty did not hold any concepts incompatible with 
this approach. 
 
Hofstadter, A., and R. Kuhns, eds. Philosophies of Art and Beauty: Selected Readings in 
Aesthetics from Plato to Heidegger. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976. 
Well-chosen readings from classic works, with commentary provided, marred occasionally by 
the editors’ anachronistic emphasis on art. The readings provide a good introduction to various 
conceptions of beauty as a general value. 
 
McMahon, Jennifer A. “Beauty.” In Routledge Companion to Aesthetics. 2d ed. Edited by Berys 
Gaut and Dominic Lopes, 307–319. London and New York: Routledge, 2005. 
A historical overview drawing out the contrast between sensuous- and formal/value-oriented 
approaches to beauty, culminating in the contrast between Freud’s pleasure principle and the 
constructivist approach of cognitive science. 
 
Mothersill, Mary. “Beauty and the Critic’s Judgment: Remapping Aesthetics.” In The Blackwell 
Guide to Aesthetics. Edited by Peter Kivy, 152–166. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2004. 
Setting out the change in focus in philosophical aesthetics between the 19th and 20th century, 
Mothersill then proceeds to analyze beauty with a view to its significance for understanding 
aesthetic value in relation to art. 
 
Mothersill, Mary. “Beauty.” In A Companion to Aesthetics. 2nd ed. Edited by Stephen Davies, 
Kathleen Higgins, Robert Hopkins, Robert Stecker, and David E. Cooper, 166-171. Malden, 
MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009. 
Mothersill considers the contributions made by key historical figures before settling on Hegel’s 
historicism as providing the most helpful insight for the present context. Available online. 
 
 “Beauty.” In Encyclopedia of Aesthetics. 2nd ed. Edited by Michael Kelly. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2014. 
In the course of setting out the historical foundations to the concept beauty, we are provided with 
an excellent summary of the key concepts that still dominate or underpin philosophical 
aesthetics, including pleasure, desire, the good, disinterest, taste, value, and love. Available at 
Oxford Art Online by subscription. 
 
Schaper, Eva, ed. Pleasure, Preference and Value. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 1983. 
A series of essays by prominent philosophers on the nature of aesthetic value, which are very 
useful as an introduction to the study of value theory, including essays on taste, pleasure, 
aesthetic interest, aesthetic realism, and aesthetic objectivity. 
 
Zangwill, Nick. “Beauty.” In The Oxford Handbook of Aesthetics. Edited by Jerrold Levinson, 
325–343. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003. 
An introduction to the tradition of analytic approaches to value theory, beauty is analyzed into 




Beauty is often analyzed into hierarchical components: such as the properties or qualities that are 
in some sense beauty’s base and the kind of relation that exists between beauty and its base, such 
as supervenience, emergence, or an act of deliberation. Conclusions are then drawn or defended 
regarding objectivity-subjectivity, cognitivism-noncognitivism, realism-antirealism, and 
necessary and sufficient conditions regarding beauty. Zangwill 2001 characterizes beauty’s base 
as a combination of sensuous or formal properties and beauty’s relation to its base as 
supervenience in order to defend aesthetic realism. The supervenience relation between base 
properties and beauty has been critiqued by Zemach 1997. It points to the influence of fashion 
on taste, where over time the supervenience base remains the same, but the supervening property 
might change. Zemach attempts to reconcile the idea of beauty as an objective property with the 
idea that judgments of beauty are always perspectival. According to Mothersill 1984, through 
rational deliberation beauty can be discerned in some combination of formal aesthetic properties. 
Formal aesthetic properties are those properties that have no simple names, are revealed only by 
acquaintance, and are grasped only through considerable attention to the object. Mothersill 
draws attention to the objective nature of beauty’s subjectivity, which might be understood to 
show how cognitivism and subjectivity are compatible in judgments of beauty. Higgins 2000, 
Engler 1990, and Engler 2002 argue that beauty is a cluster concept. They identify conditions for 
beauty, though each author understands the nature of the conditions differently: Higgins as 
culturally grounded sufficient conditions and beauty an emergent property, and Engler as 
necessary and sufficient according to a robust aesthetic realism. In any case, the conditions they 
each identify include those that lack necessary and sufficient conditions such as radiance 
(Higgins) and elegance and harmony (Engler), so we are no closer to necessary or sufficient 
conditions for beauty. Sircello 1975 avoids a hierarchical approach, arguing that beauty is a 
property that exists in an object to a qualitatively high degree and satisfies certain necessary 
conditions: it is found pleasurable by a connoisseur of the aspect in question and excludes 
properties considered a defect relative to the object’s perceived function. Sibley 1965 has argued 
that all aesthetic properties are noncondition governed (i.e., they lack necessary or sufficient 
conditions) except negatively. “Condition governed negatively” refers to those properties that, 
when present, preclude a particular aesthetic property. So for example, bold harsh lines might be 
sufficient to preclude delicacy. Promising in this vein is Lorand 1994, with its identification of 
sufficient conditions for the absence of beauty. While Lorand at times might be understood to 
suggest that certain kinds of object might simply preclude beauty, De Clercq 2005 would 
suggest otherwise, arguing that there is no category of aesthetic objects. 
 
De Clercq, Rafael. “Aesthetic Terms, Metaphor, and the Nature of Aesthetic Properties.” 
Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 63:1 (2005): 27-32. 
Argues that there is no particular category of aesthetic objects and aesthetic terms can be used 
universally (to any kind of thing or object). This is thought to be significant because it suggests 
that an analysis of any kind of aesthetic property whether of a perceptual or non-perceptual 
object should be applicable to understanding the nature of aesthetic properties simpliciter.  
 
Engler, Gideon. “Aesthetics in Science and in Art.” British Journal of Aesthetics 30.1 (1990): 
24–34. 
Argues that there are five conditions that in combination are sufficient for 
scientific/mathematical beauty. They are symmetry, simplicity, order/coherence/unity, elegance, 
and harmony. The latter two, elegance and harmony, are also necessary conditions. Engler 
explains what these mean in the scientific/mathematical context. 
 
Engler, Gideon. ““Einstein and the most beautiful theories in Physics.” International Studies in 
the Philosophy of Science 16.1 (2002): 27–37. 
To the necessary conditions of elegance and harmony, in combination with the sufficient 
conditions of symmetry, simplicity, and order/coherence/unity, Engler now argues that perfect 
logical consistency is necessary for beauty. In this paper, he analyses particular scientific 
theories in terms of their beauty. 
Higgins, Kathleen. “Beauty and Its Kitsch Competitors.” In Beauty Matters. Edited by Peg 
Brand, 87–111. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000. 
Identifies a cluster of seven conditions for beauty including orderly structure, unity wrought 
from distinct elements, perfection, an occasion for epiphany, radiance, overpowering impact, 
and the incitement of love, in the process distinguishing beauty from kitsch, flawlessness, and 
glamour. Higgins’s conditions are sufficient in some combination, but none of the conditions are 
necessary. 
 
Lorand, Ruth. “Beauty and Its Opposites.” Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 52.4 (1994): 
399–406. 
Lorand argues that although there are no necessary or sufficient conditions for beauty, there are 
features that, when true of any object, are sufficient to preclude beauty. An object cannot be 
beautiful and ugly, meaningless, kitsch, boring, insignificant, or irrelevant. Hence, beauty is not 
condition governed except negatively. 
 
Mothersill, Mary. Beauty Restored. Oxford: Clarendon, 1984. 
This is the text commonly thought to have revived interest in philosophical theories of beauty. 
Since the publication of this book, a steady stream of studies on beauty have appeared. 
Mothersill distinguishes between personal preference and aesthetic judgments and argues that 
when a focus on formal aesthetic qualities causes pleasure, we are experiencing beauty. 
 
Sibley, Frank N. “Aesthetic Concepts.” In Collected Papers on Aesthetics. Edited by C. Barrett, 
61–89. Oxford: Blackwell, 1965. 
This has become one of the classic papers in philosophical aesthetics in the analytical tradition. 
Sibley identifies five different kinds of concepts in terms of the degree to which they are 
condition governed. He argues that aesthetic properties are not condition governed except some 
are condition governed negatively. 
 
Sircello, Guy. A New Theory of Beauty. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975. 
Argues that beauty is a property that is enjoyed and cannot be measured in a quantitative sense 
or experienced as a deficiency, and that only those with sufficient experience of the particular 
quality (and are capable of enjoying beauty in objects of the kind under consideration) can judge 
an object’s beauty. 
 
Zangwill, Nick. The Metaphysics of Beauty. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001. 
Analyzes the relation of aesthetic properties to nonaesthetic properties, analyzes the relation of 
beauty to other aesthetic concepts, and defends a version of aesthetic realism, suggesting that 
there is a hierarchy of aesthetic properties with beauty being the ultimate positive verdict. The 
relation between the nonaesthetic and aesthetic is supervenience. 
 
Zemach, Eddy M. Real Beauty. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997. 
Develops a theory of beauty according to which beauty is always judged from a particular 
cultural (rather than personal) perspective and shows how this can be deemed compatible with 
the objectivity of beauty. A two-way dependency relation is identified between aesthetic realism 
and scientific realism. 
 
The Sensuous and Desire 
The Sophists in ancient Greece taught that beauty concerned the pleasures of the eye and ear. 
Those theories that treat beauty as a sensuous property, or at least make no distinction between 
sensuous preference and beauty in some contexts, such as that expressed in Sircello 1989, 
typically assume our response to beauty is characterized by desire. An encyclopedia entry on 
beauty and sex, Freeland 2006 discusses many such theories. In Tatarkiewicz 1974, a historian 
of aesthetic theories tells us that the 3rd-century theologian-philosopher Tertullian claimed that 
beauty was put on this earth by the devil to distract us from the good, so presumably Tertullian 
thought beauty was an object of desire, while Johannes Scotus Erigena, a theologian and 
philosopher in the 9th century, argued that a mind filled with desire for an object could not 
perceive its beauty. This latter view reflects the tradition according to which beauty is 
understood as an expression of freedom, as it showed that people could be motivated by a higher 
or secondary nature; hence, they were not completely compelled in their actions by the physical 
needs and desires of primary nature. This is the context of Erigena’s writing on beauty. 
However, in stark contrast, Dutton 2009 takes the Tertullian line in conception if not in 
evaluation when it conceives beauty as a sensuous property of objects that we are naturally 
predisposed to desire or consume in some way with various metaphorical cases derived from this 
more primary case. Certain works, such as Nehamas 2007, link all such desire for beauty to 
sexual desire, an approach found in the beauty theory of Pinker 1997 in evolutionary psychology 
and Ramachandran and Hirstein 1999 in neuroscience. An unexpected implication of conceiving 
of beauty as an instinct is cultural chauvinism. Without intentionality in the equation, taste for 
beauty would seem to have its own trajectory if practiced over time, and hence the art culture 
usually drawn upon to demonstrate beauty in these accounts is presented as the necessary 
culmination of beauty sensibility rather than as contingent and culturally relative. Such accounts 
would have to assume that variations between cultures reflect variations in progress along a 
necessary trajectory. To return to a latter-day Tertullian, the 19th-century Danish philosopher 
Kierkegaard held both sensuous and intellectual conceptions of beauty, indirectly condemning 
the former when he argued that the excessive appreciation of beauty’s sensuous nature reveals 
ethical immaturity (Kierkegaard 1992). 
 
Dutton, Denis. The Art Instinct: Beauty, Pleasure & Human Evolution. New York: Bloomsbury, 
2009. 
Beauty can be understood as an environmental trigger to motivate actions that enhance or once 
enhanced survival. This is presented as a view to counter relativism; however, such views imply 
the philosophically naive thesis that objects are simply given in cognition. 
 
Freeland, Cynthia. “Beauty and Sex.” In Sex from Plato to Paglia: A Philosophical 
Encyclopedia. Vol. 1. Edited by Alan Soble, 86–95. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2006. 
Presents a summary of a very comprehensive selection of those beauty theories in which a 
relation to beauty as sexual stimulant or sexual catalyst can be identified. Freeland provides a 
brief reference to the context of the author’s perspective and provides a further impressive range 
of references. 
 
Kierkegaard, Søren. Either/or: A Fragment of Life. Edited by Victor Eremita and translated by 
Alistair Hannay. London: Penguin, 1992. 
Written in 1843 as if by two anonymous authors, two opposing ways to live are defended on 
aesthetic grounds. On the one hand, a life that is responsible, ordered, and purposeful, while on 
the other, a life directed to continuous short-term pleasures, correspond to two opposing 
conceptions of beauty. 
 
Nehamas, Alexander. Only a Promise of Happiness: The Place of Beauty in a World of Art. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007. 
Presents a conception of beauty according to which all beauty is linked to the erotic and all 
beauty is the object of longing or a desire of some sort. The author demonstrates his ideas 
through discussing his responses to a favorite painting. A paperback version was published in 
2010. 
 
Pinker, Stephen. How the Mind Works. New York: Norton, 1997. 
Beauty is almost exclusively taken to mean sexual attraction by Pinker. Pinker has his own 
variations on this theme including that all forms deemed attractive reflect the form exhibited by 
fertile females, or regarding the male, involvement in art demonstrates their access to leisure 
time having secured the necessities of life, hence their desirability as a mate. 
 
Ramachandran, V. S., and W. Hirstein. “The Science of Art: A Neurological Theory of 
Aesthetic Experience.” Journal of Consciousness Studies 6.6–7 (1999): 15–51. 
This paper argues that all combinations of visual elements found beautiful somehow reflect 
relations that exist in objects, the consumption of which will aid our survival or those of our 
offspring. 
 
Sircello, Guy. Love and Beauty. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989. 
The author discusses sexual love and relationships, attempting to demonstrate longing and desire 
as an example of the phenomenology of beauty. Not as philosophically interesting as his earlier 
book on beauty, Sircello extends his theory of beauty as a property of a qualitatively high degree 
into the realm of human physical relationships. 
 
Tatarkiewicz, Wladyslaw. The History of Aesthetics. Vols. 1–2. The Hague: Mouton, 1974. 
Of three volumes, Volumes 1 and 2 provide an account of the various philosophical figures from 
the ancient and medieval period who wrote on beauty. The philosophers that are discussed link 
beauty to the human being’s relation to the larger scheme of things in various ways according to 
their culturally based metaphysical and religious commitments. 
 
Standards 
Among those who treat beauty as a property are authors who aim to identify standards by which 
one ought to judge the merit of art, aesthetic objects, or, in the case of Hepburn 1993, nature. 
This is not to be confused with Kant’s claim of the a priori universality of aesthetic judgments in 
his “Critique of Aesthetic Judgment,” which refers to the conditions under which someone takes 
themselves to be making an aesthetic judgment regardless of whether others agree. However, 
some commentators such as Brent Kalar (Kalar 2006) attempt to derive standards of beauty from 
Kant’s aesthetic theory in a way that preserves the relation between beauty and pleasure as 
intentional rather than causal. In another vein entirely, Etcoff 1999 presents a good example of 
the largely nonphilosophical causal account of beauty, drawing upon cognitive science and 
evolutionary theory to ground what the author considers standards of beauty in women and men. 
In contrast, Brand 2000 assembles a collection of papers that contest the notion of universal 
standards of physical beauty in men and women. On the beauty of the environment, Carlson and 
Parsons 2008 argues that when appreciating natural beauty, we should be constrained by 
scientifically based concepts of the object analogous to the way we might consider knowledge of 
an artist and their style, aims, and purposes necessary for an appreciation of their art. Bourdieu 
1984 treats beauty as a culturally imposed standard by which we are coerced into hierarchies of 
taste in the interest of certain dominant groups, while Wolf 1990 applies the same argument to 
standards of beauty imposed by men upon women to undermine their autonomy. The most 
famous essay on aesthetic standards warrants special mention. David Hume’s essay written in 
the 18th century, Hume 1987, suggests we do well to pay attention to those around us whom we 
judge to be better at such judgment either generally or in regard to particular kinds of objects 
about which they are knowledgeable and experienced. As such, although there are standards of 
beauty, the point is not so much to get it right for its own sake but to approximate our values to 
those in our communities. 
 
Bourdieu, Pierre. Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste. Translated by Richard 
Nice. New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984. 
Argues that aesthetic categories, particularly conceptions of beauty, are conceived in ways that 
serve to reinforce the public’s endorsement of their ruling elite. As a consequence, the aesthetic 
of lower or subclasses is implicitly judged inferior relative to the ruling class. 
 
Brand, Peg Zeglin, ed. Beauty Matters. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000. 
A collection of essays from various perspectives; the common thread is an examination of the 
kinds of qualities, objects, designs, ideas, and perspectives that can be endorsed on aesthetic 
grounds. In total, the views expressed present a challenge to traditional conceptions of standards 
of beauty. 
 
Carlson, Allen, and Glenn Parsons. Functional Beauty. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. 
The purpose here is to establish an objective basis for correct standards of beauty so as to avoid 
relativism. Kendall Walton’s categories of art are used as an analogy for scientific categories of 
nature for the purpose of using beauty as a guide for conservation of the natural environment. 
 
Etcoff, Nancy. Survival of the Prettiest: The Science of Beauty. London: Little, Brown, 1999. 
A psychology of beauty that is as reductive as the standard evolutionary accounts only more 
detailed, informative, and better researched than is typical of these accounts. This book is 
mentioned in various analytical approaches to naturalizing beauty. However, the content of the 
arguments is largely unexamined philosophically. 
 
Hepburn, Ronald W. “Trivial and Serious in Aesthetic Appreciation of Nature.” In Landscape, 
Natural Beauty, and the Arts. Edited by Salim Kemal and Ivan Gaskell, 65–80. Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993. 
Concerned with establishing standards of natural beauty against competing interests of industry, 
commerce, and urban expansion, the author tends toward legislating about what is deemed the 
appropriate object of appreciation when one appreciates nature. He eventually capitulates, 
admitting that it is the most aesthetically rewarding perception that is the right one. 
 
Hume, David. “Of the Standard of Taste.” In Essays Moral, Political, Literary. Edited by E. 
Miller, 226–252. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Classics, 1987. 
Written in 1757, the key idea is that although there may be principles of taste, these are 
discovered empirically. However, the test is whether by adopting the principles in appreciating 
an object, one’s sentiment is appropriately engaged because only our experience can verify 
principles of taste. 
 
Kalar, Brent. The Demands of Taste in Kant’s Aesthetics. London: Continuum, 2006. 
Deriving standards for judging beauty in art and nature from Kant’s “Critique of Aesthetic 
Judgment,” Kalar attempts to reconcile Kant’s claim of the universality of aesthetic judgment 
with the normative demand to take pleasure in the object judged to be beautiful. 
 
Wolf, Naomi. The Beauty Myth. London: Chatto & Windus, 1990. 
The main argument is influenced by Bourdieu’s theory of beauty according to which aesthetic 
value is exploited by the dominant ruling classes. Wolf argues that men exploit women’s 
susceptibility to standards of beauty. The nature of beauty that would allow it to be easily 
exploited is not the focus. 
 
Beauty and Art 
Immanuel Kant in the late 18th century treated the beauty of nature as the exemplar of beauty 
but introduced “art” as evidence of our capacity for beauty. During the 19th century, Georg 
Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel thought that evidence that beauty was the expression of freedom was 
to be found in our involvement with art, not in our responses to nature. However, while the 
cognitive nature of art for Hegel has led many commentators to downplay the importance of 
beauty in Hegel’s aesthetics, Peters 2015 argues that beauty still figures prominently in Hegel’s 
theory of art.. And while Kant is often assumed to have treated the beauty of art as non-
cognitive, Guyer 1997 presents a convincing argument that would have us appreciate the layered 
and complex nature of Kant’s conception of fine art. Visual and literary artists such as William 
Hogarth and Leo Tolstoy critiqued their own art forms and in the process developed their own 
accounts of beauty as a defense or critique of their own styles of painting and writing, 
respectively (Hogarth 1955, Tolstoy 1969). Beauty was no longer associated with orientating 
ourselves to the world as an exercise in free will and finding our agency against the determinism 
of nature but instead became a term to refer to what was considered to be of artistic merit. In the 
early 20th century, philosophers and art theorists continued in this vein, developing theories of 
beauty that would serve the art they championed. The philosopher R. G. Collingwood focused 
on Cubism and Paul Cezanne, arguing that the apprehension of the beauty of the work required 
the perceiver to mentally reconstruct the artwork (Collingwood 1958), while the art theorist 
Clement Greenberg focused on the existential aspects of the painting (as opposed to 
representation) to demonstrate how one would appreciate the beauty of American abstraction 
such as Abstract Expressionism (Greenberg 1961). Another approach to the study of beauty and 
art is to draw upon a classical or seminal theory of beauty and show how it can be interpreted in 
ways that would enhance understanding of contemporary art. Nehamas 2007 and Pippin 2013 
adopt this approach in relation to Plato’s theory of beauty and Hegel’s theory of art and beauty 
respectively. Crowther 2010 successfully adopts this approach in relation to Kantian aesthetics. 
Jacques Rancière is a key figure in keeping alive an interest in the relation between freedom and 
aesthetic value in his writing on the political significance of art (Rancière 2009). 
 
Collingwood, R. G. Principles of Art. London: Oxford University Press, 1958. 
The theory of beauty developed is implicitly presented as a guide to art criticism and 
appreciation, with the work of Cezanne treated as the exemplar that reveals the essential 
character of art. Many of Collingwood’s insights are still illuminating in regard to contemporary 
art, particularly conceptual art. Ebook available. 
 
Crowther, Paul. The Kantian Aesthetic: From Knowledge to the Avant-Garde. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2010. 
An interpretation of the core thesis of Kant’s “Critique of Aesthetic Judgment” with the view to 
extending some of its key insights to accommodate contemporary art; Crowther attempts to 
reinvigorate our understanding of the relevance of Kantian aesthetics for contemporary art. A 
paperback version was published in 2014. 
 
Greenberg, Clement. Art and Culture: Critical Essays. Boston: Beacon, 1961. 
The artwork does not represent reality but is itself an original. An analogy might be helpful here. 
An array of intersecting and overlapping reeds in a tangle of undergrowth does not copy or 
represent something else. Neither do the skeins of paint on a canvas, yet both can have aesthetic 
value. 
 
Guyer, Paul. “Kant’s Conception of Fine Art.” In Kant and the Claims of Taste. 2d ed. Edited by 
Paul Guyer, 351–368. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997. 
Provides a close reading of Kant’s “Critique of Aesthetic Judgment,” offering textual evidence 
to support the view that Kant did not advocate aesthetic formalism in the sense commonly 
employed today. 
 
Hogarth, William. The Analysis of Beauty. Edited by Joseph Burke. Oxford: Clarendon, 1955. 
Written in 1753, Hogarth identifies the components of art that constitute its beauty such as what 
he calls the serpentine line and the “form” of the triangle. He argues, however, that what we 
know the object to be influences whether we can find such components beautiful. Contrast and 
variety are also important. 
 
Nehamas, Alexander. Only a Promise of Happiness: The Place of Beauty in a World of Art. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007. 
An extension to everyday objects and artworks of a conception of beauty derived from Plato. 
However, Nehamas’s interpretation of Plato’s conception of beauty as the object not only of love 
but also of desire is controversial. A similar reservation extends to his notion of Kant’s aesthetic 
formalism. 
 
Peters, Julia. Hegel on Beauty. New York and London: Routledge, 2015. 
Argues that Hegel did not privilege art over nature concerning beauty but instead conceived art 
as the means by which soul or mind could be expressed, and the vehicle for such expression was 
beauty or idealised form. What was considered idealised form developed through history. 
 
Pippin, Robert. After the Beautiful: Hegel and the Philosophy of Pictorial Modernism. Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 2013. 
Pippin argues that Hegel’s core thesis concerning the meaning and significance of art has 
different implications for understanding art after Hegel, than Hegel himself could have 
anticipated. Through analysis of paintings by Manet and Cezanne, Pippin demonstrates the 
awareness that Hegel initiated in aesthetics toward the conditions for ascribing meaning to art. 
 
Rancière, Jacques. The Emancipated Spectator. London and New York: Verso, 2009. 
Through engagement made possible by artistic forms of endeavor, new ways of carving up 
experience can be revealed or invented. Independent from what nature would prescribe for a 
person, artistic endeavor is linked to morality, human agency, or what in earlier theories would 
be thought of as spirit, will, or freedom, hence the possibility of human culture. 
 
Tolstoy, Leo. What Is Art? And Essays on Art. Translated by Aylmer Maude. London: Oxford 
University Press, 1969. 
Tolstoy’s earlier essay “On Art,” written around 1896, argues that content without form and 
sincerity is information; attention to form for its own sake is “art for art’s sake”; and sincerity 
without important content and clear form is self-indulgence. Only the combination of significant 
content, formal excellence, and sincere artistic intention to a high degree results in beauty. 
 
Beauty and Disinterest 
The notion of “disinterest,” which is still used as a foil for cognitive aesthetic theories, can be 
traced back to aesthetic attitude and aesthetic perception theories that proliferated in the early 
and mid-20th century, such as in Stolnitz 1960, which according to Rind 2002 mistakenly 
attributes its own conceptions of disinterested perception and disinterested attitude to various 
18th-century philosophers, particularly Immanuel Kant. In a similar vein to Rind, Zangwill 2003 
points out that the notion of disinterest found in Kant, applies only to the pleasure of beauty, not 
the judgment, reflection, or attitude. The idea of disinterested pleasure found in Kant possibly 
relates to the theoretical interest to identify a social (and hence moral) disposition in humans that 
is neither desire nor duty, in order to overcome the sentiment versus reason debate that existed at 
the time concerning morality. Kant owned a translation of Cicero’s On Duties 1913 (as did 
Hume) in which Cicero discusses the Stoic Panaetius’s notion of harmony of the soul, moral 
beauty, moral sensibility, or decorum. The distinctive character of the relevant pleasure shares 
some similarities with Christian Wolff’s notion of the pleasure of perfection that, according to 
Beiser 2009, was understood by Wolff as intentional pleasure in contrast to pleasure as pure 
affect. The distinctions among three kinds of pleasure that we find in Kant’s aesthetic theory 
appear in a treatise written by his predecessor, Francis Hutcheson, who distinguished among 
pleasures of appetite, prudential interest, and beauty (Hutcheson 1971). It is instructive that 
Hutcheson deemed his conception of beauty compatible with the beauty of intellectual 
constructs such as may be found in historical writing. The sense in which Kant writes that we do 
not take interest in the object of beauty is compatible with other 18th-century writers such as 
Hutcheson and the third Earl of Shaftesbury. As Guyer 2005 points out, Shaftesbury believed 
that the relevance of an object’s utility could be relevant to its beauty without compromising the 
independence of the pleasure taken in beauty from the possession, use, or consumption of it. The 
independence referred to the basis of the pleasure, not the basis of the configuration, concept, or 
construct about which an aesthetic judgment was made. Levinson 1996 adapts and develops a 
notion of disinterested pleasure in relation to aesthetic judgment that furthers some aspects of 
Kant’s account. Riggle 2016 critiques Levinson’s account by arguing that Kant’s conception of 
aesthetic ideas supports a shift away from pleasure toward love as the defining response to 
beauty. Korsmeyer 2006 argues that pleasure, when stripped of its misconceptions, aptly 
characterizes the experience of beauty. 
 
Beiser, Frederick C. Diotima’s Children: German Aesthetic Rationalism from Leibniz to 
Lessing. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. 
A very useful discussion of Christian Wolff’s aesthetic theory, locating it historically and 
drawing together his writings on aesthetics from various sources. Wolff’s conception of the kind 
of pleasure taken in perfection can be understood as a useful lead on Kant’s conception of 
disinterested pleasure. 
 
Cicero, Marcus. On Duties (De Officius). Translated by Walter Miller. Loeb Classical Library. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1913. 
Written in the 1st century BCE, Cicero discusses second-generation ancient Stoic Panaetius’s 
ideas on the relation between sensibility and rationality in moral judgments. Panaetius’s On 
Being Yourself and On Function no longer exist, but Cicero’s references are corroborated by 
Seneca, Demosthenes (in Plutarch), and later, Diogenes Laertius and Galen. 
 
Guyer, Paul. “Beauty and Utility in Eighteenth-Century Aesthetics.” In Values of Beauty: 
Historical Essays in Aesthetics. Edited by Paul Guyer, 110–128. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005. 
Provides a very useful discussion of the ideas on beauty-as-utility held by 18th-century writers 
on beauty. A sense is demonstrated in which beauty-as-utility is not incompatible with the idea 
that the pleasure found in beauty is independent of the pleasure of owning, using, or consuming 
the object. 
 
Hutcheson, Francis. Inquiry into the Original of Our Idea of Beauty and Virtue. New York: 
Garland, 1971. 
In this work written in 1725, Hutcheson holds that our perception of beauty orientates us to the 
world in a way conducive to morality. To this end, he distinguishes between the pleasure of 
appetite, of personal benefit, and of beauty. That we find things beautiful that are good for us is a 
sign of God’s beneficence. 
 
Korsmeyer, Carolyn. “Terrible Beauties.” In Contemporary Debates in Aesthetics and the 
Philosophy of Art. Edited by Matthew Kieran, 51-65. Oxford: Blackwell, 2006. 
Argues that many misconceptions of beauty stem from contrasting beauty with the wrong values 
(the ugly and the sublime) and from two mistaken assumptions: that pleasure is the opposite of 
pain and that pleasure is a bodily sensation. Korsmeyer argues that showing an emotion through 
a new lens is the pleasure of beauty. To test this, disgust, is considered. 
 
Levinson, Jerrold. The Pleasures of Aesthetics: Philosophical Essays. Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1996. 
Argues that aesthetic qualities are constituted by relationships of dependence and mutual 
involvement among a comprehensive set of properties of the artwork, including vehicle 
(observable structure), content (specific qualities and meanings), historical setting, and context. 
If attention to this aspect of the work results in disinterested pleasure, then the work is 
aesthetically successful. 
 
Riggle, Nick. “On the Interest in Beauty and Disinterest.” Philosophers’ Imprint 16. 9 (2016): 1-
14. 
Critiques the positive and negative aspects of disinterested pleasure as identified by Levinson: 
these include the due attention to the object, and without personal interests, respectively. 
Includes evocative examples drawn from literary works to demonstrate that experiences of 
beauty are connected to how we construe ourselves and our place in the world. Kant’s 
conception of aesthetic ideas is eventually drawn upon to argue that “love” rather than 
“pleasure” might better characterize an experience of beauty. 
 
Rind, Miles. “The Concept of Disinterestedness in Eighteenth-Century British Aesthetics.” 
Journal of the History of Philosophy 40.1 (2002): 67–87. 
Convincingly dissociates 18th-century philosophical writings on beauty from the notion of 
disinterested perception developed by Jerome Stolnitz. Stolnitz’s notion can be recognized as the 
basis of the caricatures of disinterest and formalism (mistakenly associated with Kant) often 
used as a foil in recent 20th-century analytical writing on philosophy of art and natural beauty. 
 
Stolnitz, Jerome. Aesthetics and Philosophy of Art Criticism. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1960. 
Arguably misrepresents 18th-century writing on beauty by applying the term “disinterest” to 
judging and reflecting. Many authors argue in contrast that the correct use of “disinterest” in 
18th-century writing refers to the basis upon which one takes pleasure in the object, not the basis 
upon which one interprets or conceives the object. 
 
Zangwill, Nick. “UnKantian Notions of Disinterest.” In Kant’s Critique of the Power of 
Judgment: Critical Essays. Edited by Paul Guyer, 63–66. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 
2003. 
Sets out the ways in which the notion of “disinterest” is caricatured in recent discussions of 
beauty, and explains how these notions differ from the way the term “disinterest” functions in 
Kant’s aesthetic theory. 
 
Beauty and Nature 
According to Hepburn 2004, while the beauty of nature was an important consideration prior to 
the 20th century, it was subsequently overshadowed once the metaphysical and religious basis of 
its preeminence had faded. In the 20th century, beauty was reconceived as an evaluative concept 
of art. However, although philosophical writing on the aesthetics of nature did continue in those 
writers interested in the sublime and those writers working in the tradition of Immanuel Kant, in 
recent years a new focus has emerged. The renewed interest in the beauty of nature has been 
spearheaded by authors such as Allen Carlson and Glenn Parsons, who argue that beauty has an 
instrumental value in directing us toward what is worth conserving in the natural environment 
(Carlson 2004, Carlson and Parsons 2008). They argue that one should configure the natural 
environment according to scientifically constrained classes and categories in a way analogous to 
the categories of art applied in art appreciation. Whereas art appreciation theories are concerned 
with promoting engagement with artistic intention as evidenced in the work, Carlson and 
Parsons assert that scientific categories they treat as natural kinds ought to be the constraints on 
what is deemed relevant to appreciation of nature’s beauty. Their foil is nature treated as 
picturesque or as appreciated according to theories of aesthetic distance. This foil is adopted by 
most of the authors writing on environmental beauty. However, Marcia Muelder Eaton, who 
argues that the experience of the beauty of nature involves caring about and engaging with the 
environment, criticizes the earlier version of Carlson’s scientifically grounded conception of 
beauty as overly intellectual (Eaton 2001). Nick Zangwill digs his heels in, however, with a 
version of formalism that would satisfy an aesthetic attitude theorist, but his motivation is a 
robust aesthetic realism (Zangwill 2001). It is worth noting that the new developments in 
environmental aesthetics are as tangential to Kantian aesthetics as Zangwill’s formalism. As 
Guyer 2005 has argued, consideration of what an object is used for may be relevant to an 
aesthetic judgment without undermining Kant’s particular sense of aesthetic form. Savile 1987 
draws out another sense of utility from Kant’s theory, according to which the beauty of nature 
orientates us toward it in such a way that we feel incorporated into it rather than alienated from 
it. This is in complete contrast to Friedrich Nietzsche, according to whom beauty in nature is an 
illusion we project upon it in order to mask the true horror of reality and make life palatable for 
us (Nietzsche 1967). Kemal and Gaskell 1993 and Moore 2008 temper such a view by analyzing 
concepts of natural beauty relative to their cultural contexts. A notable contrast between them is 
that while Kemal and Gaskell reject the idea that natural beauty is fundamental within any 
hierarchy of aesthetic concepts, Moore argues that an experience of natural beauty is a bedrock 
expression of value. 
 
Carlson, Allen. “Appreciation and the Natural Environment.” In The Aesthetics of Natural 
Environments. Edited by Allen Carlson and Arnold Berleant, 63–75. Peterborough, Canada: 
Broadview, 2004. 
Presents a basis to appreciating natural beauty opposed to perceiving it as picturesque landscape. 
This is the essay, originally published in 1979, that directed attention back to natural beauty 
about which there now exists a growing literature. 
 
Carlson, Allen, and Glenn Parsons. Functional Beauty. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. 
In an attempt to avoid relativism in aesthetic judgments, Carlson and Parsons develop a 
framework for aesthetically appreciating nature that is grounded in scientific categories, 
analogous to Kendall Walton’s categories of art. 
 
Eaton, Marcia Muelder. Merit, Aesthetic and Ethical. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. 
In Part 4, Eaton critiques Carlson’s aesthetic theory of nature, by arguing that imaginative 
engagement is essential for aesthetic appreciation. She argues that the appreciation of beauty 
should be cultivated in objects worth conserving. So instead of beauty guiding conservation, 
beauty is used to facilitate the conservation of objects judged to be worth conserving on other 
grounds. 
 
Guyer, Paul. “Beauty and Utility in Eighteenth-Century Aesthetics.” In Values of Beauty: 
Historical Essays in Aesthetics. Edited by Paul Guyer, 110–128. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005. 
Provides a very useful discussion of the ideas on beauty-as-utility held by 18th-century writers 
on beauty. A sense is demonstrated in which beauty-as-utility is not incompatible with the idea 
that the pleasure found in beauty is independent of the pleasure of owning, using, or consuming 
the object. 
 
Hepburn, Ronald W. “Contemporary Aesthetics and the Neglect of Natural Beauty.” In The 
Aesthetics of Natural Environments. Edited by Allen Carlson and Arnold Berleant, 43–62. 
Peterborough, Canada: Broadview, 2004. 
Associating the pre-20th-century emphasis on natural beauty with metaphysical or religious 
beliefs, the author attempts to discover a secular-based ground for appreciating nature 
aesthetically. This essay, originally published in 1966, is treated as a classic by those authors 
who have taken up the mantle of natural beauty in the context of environmental aesthetics. 
 
Kemal, Salim, and Ivan Gaskell (eds). Landscape, Natural Beauty, and the Arts. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993. 
The papers interweave conceptions of nature and landscape art, which the editors argue show 
that attempts at a hierarchy of concepts with natural beauty as a foundation is doomed because 
the relevant interactions are far too complex. The editors compare concepts of nature-without-
metaphysics with nature-as-reflection-of-transcendent-values. The editors here attempt to move 
on from puzzles which result from overly narrow conceptions of aesthetic experience to an 
increased understanding of aesthetic experience within human culture. 
 
Moore, Ronald. Natural Beauty: A Theory of Aesthetics Beyond the Arts. Ch.5 Aesthetic 
experience revisited 91-104. Toronto, Canada: Broadview Press, 2008. 
Conceptions of nature which have evolved historically are components within the aesthetic 
experience of nature. The author distances his account from environmental aesthetics 
presumably as his account is devoid of the ideological tenor of much work in that area. Instead, 
positive aesthetic responses to natural objects are treated as bedrock expressions of value, some 
of which can be more or less apt, given the cultural context.  
 
Nietzsche, Friedrich. The Birth of Tragedy. Translated by Walter Kaufmann. New York: 
Vintage, 1967. 
First published in 1872, an early work by Nietzsche flawed in style and lacking clarity in parts, 
nonetheless it can be salutary in the face of attempts at aesthetic realism and beauty as a call to 
arms for the conservation movement. Nietzsche asserts that beauty is an illusion projected onto 
nature to mask the horror of reality. 
 
Savile, Anthony. Aesthetic Reconstructions: The Seminal Writings of Lessing, Kant, and 
Schiller. Oxford: Blackwell, 1987. 
Nature experienced as expressive of aesthetic ideas orientates us to the world such that we feel 
incorporated into it and, as Kant would say, our rational self finds a place in the sensuous world. 
This alerts the reader to Kant’s intellectual motivation in turning to beauty in his third critique. 
 
Zangwill, Nick. “Formal Natural Beauty.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 101.1 (2001): 
209–224. 
Provides a very robust version of aesthetic realism according to which aesthetic properties are 
objective formal properties. The price Zangwill pays for this robustness is demonstrated in his 
example of plastic flowers, which he treats as aesthetically indistinguishable from real flowers. 
 
Beauty Contested 
In Ludwig Wittgenstein’s lectures on aesthetics (Wittgenstein 1966), one can find the model for 
a deflationary account of beauty according to which one might explore the balance between 
causal factors, the intention of one’s engagement, and a number of other contingencies peculiar 
to the particular situation. Alternatively, conceptions of beauty might be understood as part of a 
dialectical structure according to which, as Croce 1992 argues, we cannot conceive of beauty 
without conceiving of ugliness, as the one is needed to complete the other. In addition to 
deflation and dialectic, beauty might be deconstructed. Bourdieu 1984 argues that beauty is a 
culturally imposed standard of taste or, more specifically, a form of cultural coercion imposed 
by the dominant classes. This view is not incompatible with some natural-kind theory of beauty, 
given that implicit in such a view is the apparent susceptibility of the masses to coercion 
concerning beauty. Wolf 1990 presents a similar deconstruction along gendered lines, while 
Korsmeyer 2004 argues that aesthetic concepts have been so exploited by male interests that 
they are irreversibly corrupted and require a complete reconceptualization in order to incorporate 
a feminine perspective. Lintott 2010 regrets that feminists have neglected natural beauty, 
arguing that expertise in feminism is required for feminist analyses of beauty. However, 
expertise in philosophical accounts of beauty might be useful also. The caricature of 
“disinterestedness” in both the feminist critiques of beauty and the burgeoning literature on 
environmental beauty is a case in point. However, there are those who would break with 
traditional aesthetics altogether, attempting to think beyond the categories of what has been 
referred to as Western ontotheology. Swearingen and Cutting-Gray 2002 goes beyond feelings 
like desire, pleasure, beauty, and the sublime and treats instead feelings like bliss, glory, and 
what is referred to as “extreme beauty.” This project is referred to as a philosophy of difference. 
The concern is not to identify the relevant properties of objects or analyze the structure of the 
feeling involved but instead to draw attention to the social, imaginary, and constructed nature of 
the feelings we endorse. The feelings we endorse determine how we live, what we recognize in 
ourselves and others, and what we value and allow in ourselves and others. Authors who work in 
this vein, such as Moira Gatens (Gatens 2002), are naturally drawn into the political aspect of 
beauty. 
 
Bourdieu, Pierre. Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste. Translated by Richard 
Nice. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984. 
Bourdieu argues that aesthetic categories like beauty are tools of coercion, constructed in the 
interests of the leisured classes, to create an illusion of their “natural” superiority. The arguments 
are of interest in this context as they present evidence of the way cultural interests might exploit 
aspects of our capacity for beauty. 
 
Croce, Benedetto. The Aesthetic as Science of Expression and of the Linguistic in General. 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1992. 
In this work written in 1902, Croce attributes a dialectical role to ugliness in the evolution of 
beauty. He treats aesthetic categories as mental constructions that are nonetheless public. There 
is a sense in which he thinks of the foundation of all our concepts as fundamentally aesthetic. 
 
Gatens, Moira. “Post-Colonialism and History: Are We Responsible for the Past?” In Extreme 
Beauty. Edited by James Swearingen and Joanne Cutting-Gray, 142–151. New York and 
London: Continuum, 2002. 
Draws upon Spinoza’s ethics to explain how our sense of self is part of an imaginary 
construction that issues from collectives. Encounters with significantly different others can 
unwittingly alter our construction, but we can only change this “social imaginary” from within. 
There is no outside, no bird’s-eye view, no neutral standpoint. 
 
Korsmeyer, Caroline. Gender and Aesthetics: An Introduction. New York: Routledge. 2004. 
An examination of the way the concepts of art, creator, aesthetic value, and creativity have been 
constructed to celebrate the male perspective such that the very application of the terms 
entrenches a hierarchy of approaches and outputs that can disadvantage and devalue the female 
perspective. 
 
Lintott, Sheila. “Feminist Aesthetics and the Neglect of Natural Beauty.” Environmental Values 
19.3 (2010): 315–333. 
Argues that natural beauty has been neglected by feminists and suggests some approaches worth 
following such as Arnold Berleant’s acknowledgment that we construct our own configurations 
and concepts of nature rather than simply register nature as though it were a given. 
 
Swearingen, James, and Joanne Cutting-Gray, eds. Extreme Beauty. New York and London: 
Continuum, 2002. 
This is a collection of papers that present a new tradition of aesthetic value with Nietzsche as the 
recognized predecessor. It is presented in opposition to traditional aesthetics. This is the 
philosophy of difference, replacing beauty with bliss (Barthes) or glory (Levinas) and 
responsibility (Derrida). The stated purpose is thinking beyond categories of Western 
ontotheology. 
 
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology, and Religious 
Belief. Edited by Cyril Barrett. Oxford: Blackwell, 1966. 
In these notes, assembled from lectures he gave to a small group of students at Cambridge in 
1938, Wittgenstein argues that how one constructs one’s understanding of aesthetic response, as 
in everything else, bears the marks of aesthetic choices (e.g., reductive theories exhibit the love 
of order, system, and closure). 
 
Wolf, Naomi. The Beauty Myth. London: Chatto & Windus, 1990. 
This provides a good example of a sociological analysis of beauty according to which beauty is a 
construct imposed by men upon women to objectify and undermine them. However, Wolf does 
not analyze what it is about beauty that makes it such a ready tool of coercion and oppression. 
 
Beauty Experienced 
The guiding maxim of American Pragmatism after Charles Sanders Peirce is that the effects or 
consequences of one’s conception of an object constitute at least in large part that conception. In 
philosophical aesthetics, Dewey 1958 accounted for aesthetic values like beauty by analyzing 
the difference they make to our experience generally. “Experience” was a core concept in 
Dewey’s philosophy, constituted by the subject’s identification and selection of elements from 
the flow of awareness. That is, experience is not conceived in pragmatist accounts as pure affect: 
the pragmatist conception of experience differs markedly from the phenomenologist’s notion of 
“primary consciousness,” such as that developed by Merleau-Ponty 1962. According to Dewey, 
there is a relation of interdependency between our apprehension and our conception of beauty. 
Furthermore, for Dewey and present-day aesthetic pragmatists like Yuriko Saito (Saito 2008), 
experiences of beauty are not limited to a special category of object such as art but can be 
experienced in everyday objects and events. Certain pragmatists like Joseph Margolis suggest 
that value judgments properly so-called are subjective responses grounded in culturally acquired 
concepts (Margolis 2009). This does not necessarily imply relativism but is compatible with a 
sensible pluralism in the vein of the concept of critical horizons offered in Gadamer 1986. In 
these accounts, culture refers not necessarily to the arts but to all interactions between members 
of a community that contribute to self-understanding constrained by the demands of 
communication. As such, concepts culturally acquired, internalized over a lifetime as habits of 
mind as Dewey suggests, necessarily have a public or social dimension. Personal experience is 
macroreduced to communal experience in the vein suggested by Kant’s Sensus Communis in the 
“Critique of Aesthetic Judgment.” Somewhat tangential to the pragmatist privileging of 
community over individual in the order of aesthetic relations, Shusterman 2000 argues that 
beauty names the experience that is unified and harmonious, in virtue of the understanding it 
yields. Although latter-day aesthetic pragmatists such as Margolis, Saito, and Richard 
Shusterman typically dismiss Kant’s aesthetic theory as arid formalism, this antipathy is 
arguably based on a misunderstanding of Kant’s aesthetic theory to the extent that on the 
contrary, Kantian aesthetics can be shown to be the forerunner of experiential or pragmatist 
aesthetics, as McMahon 2011 argues. 
Dewey, John. Art as Experience. New York: Capricorn, 1958. 
Aesthetic experience implicates engagement in virtue of the concepts we hold. Aesthetic 
experience is defined according to the activity it occasions: a fully engaged and reflective 
attention. The problem according to Dewey is “recovering the continuity of esthetic experience 
with normal processes of living” (p. 216). 
 
Gadamer, Hans-Georg. The Relevance of the Beautiful and Other Essays. Edited by Robert 
Bernasconi. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1986. 
Develops a notion of pluralism as opposed to relativism through his concept of the horizons of 
understanding: a person factors into his or her point of view awareness that it is just one point of 
view. This facilitates communication between those holding different convictions, a claim 
sometimes made in relation to aesthetic judgment. 
 
Margolis, Joseph. Arts and the Definition of the Human: Toward a Philosophical Anthropology. 
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009. 
Demonstration through discussion of art that value judgments are subjective responses grounded 
in culturally acquired concepts with the view to showing that this position is compatible with a 
sensible pluralism (as opposed to a vicious relativism). Judgment is constrained by the demands 
of communication and, as such, contributes to self-understanding. 
 
McMahon, Jennifer Anne. “Aesthetic Autonomy and Praxis: Art and Language in Adorno and 
Habermas.” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 19.2 (May 2011): 155–175. 
Establishes the link between Kant’s aesthetic theory and pragmatist theories of art, language, and 
meaning. Discusses the art of Olafur Eliasson to draw this out. 
 
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. The Phenomenology of Perception. Translated by Colin Smith. 
London: Routledge, 1962. 
Focusing on what he refers to as the lived body, Merleau-Ponty argues that in art we see “the 
expressive operation of the body.” To the extent that he does not factor in the role of concept as 
mediator between things that happen to us and experience, his phenomenology can be 
distinguished from pragmatism. 
 
Saito, Yuriko. Everyday Aesthetics. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008. 
Demonstrates and argues that everyday items and events can be experienced aesthetically and 
that experiencing them in this way enhances the quality of life. 
 
Shusterman, Richard. Pragmatist Aesthetics: Living Beauty, Rethinking Art. 2d ed. New York: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2000. 
Positioning pragmatist aesthetics relative to analytic aesthetics, on the one hand, and 
contemporary continental theory, on the other, Shusterman introduces his aesthetic theory that 
he calls soma-aesthetics. The shallow formalism so often associated with Kantian aesthetics by 




Beauty understood as pertaining to the form of perceptual unities or complex ideas has a long 
history. The Pythagoreans believed that beauty was to be found in the measure, proportion, 
order, and harmony that was objectively present in the world. The very structure of the heavens 
was believed to be reflected in the mathematical proportions found in nature and human 
artifacts, such as music according to the aesthetic historian Wladyslaw Tatarkiewicz 
(Tatarkiewicz 1974). In Metaphysics, Aristotle’s conception of beauty continued along these 
lines, treating beauty as a causative principle demonstrated in a special degree by the 
mathematical sciences in order, symmetry, and definiteness (Aristotle 1960). In Phaedrus, Plato 
conceived the Form of beauty as a supersensible entity (Plato 1997). Plato’s idea was that a 
grasp of beauty required our cultivation of primary perceptions of beauty in the sensuous until 
we worked through to a conception of beauty in morality, wisdom, and ultimately the good (as 
expounded in Symposium, Phaedrus, The Laws). Plotinus, the Neoplatonist, develops a mystical 
version of Platonic Form according to which the more that matter exhibits the formal harmonies 
of proportion and balance, the more the object and our perception of it partake of the One or God 
(Plotinus 1966). This idea influences theories of beauty throughout the medieval period. For 
Thomas Aquinas, beauty was an object of both perception and cognition, perceived firsthand but 
engaging cognition through its revelation of unity, clarity, and intensity (Aquinas 1964–1976). 
An alternative to the Neoplatonist tradition of Plato’s influence are the second- and third-
generation Stoics. According to Cicero, for the second-generation Stoic Panaetius, beauty was a 
harmony of the soul accessed through the proportion, harmony, or measure of behavior, 
sometimes referred to as decorum or moral beauty (Cicero 1913). This interest in moral beauty 
construed in secular terms, is taken up in the 18th century, culminating in the attempt by Kant to 
link the endorsement or feeling of respect for the moral law with the peculiar nonsensuously 
based pleasure of beauty (Kant 1987). By the early 20th century, the notion of beauty as form 
has been recast as an evaluative concept of art somewhat diminishing its link to the nature of 
meaning, ethics, and morality. However, vestiges of earlier concepts of beauty remain in those 
conceptions, for example, Scarry 1999, which relates beauty as a value to other forms of value 
such as moral value. 
 
Aquinas, St. Thomas. Summa Theologiae. Vols. 2, 19, 23, 36, 43, and 53. London and New 
York: Blackfriars, 1964–1976. 
Aquinas, who lived in the 13th century, was committed to the view that the human being 
entailed a metaphysical component. Accordingly, beauty was a characteristic of the divine. 
Aquinas distinguished between what he referred to as biologically based pleasures and the 
pleasure of beauty; only the latter lifted one into a communion with the divine. 
 
Aristotle. Metaphysics. Translated by Richard Hope. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
1960. 
Aristotle, an ancient Greek philosopher of the 4th century BCE, among his various references to 
beauty across a number of his works, treats order and definiteness as features of beauty, arguing 
that as they are present in many things, beauty must contribute as a cause to the nature of things. 
 
Cicero, Marcus. On Duties (De Officius). Translated by Walter Miller. Loeb Classical Library. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1913. 
Cicero, in the 1st century BCE, discusses ideas of decorum and moral beauty from works by 
Panaetius (On Being Yourself and On Function) that no longer exist. Panaetius’s ideas have been 
corroborated by references in Seneca, orators like Demosthenes as reported by Plutarch, and 
later biographers and commentators like Diogenes Laertius and Galen. 
 
Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Judgment. Translated by W. S. Pluhar. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 
1987. 
In this work written in 1790, Kant adapts ideas from his philosophical predecessors and sets the 
agenda for philosophical aesthetics for the next two centuries and into the present. One tradition 
furthers the link Kant drew between aesthetic and moral value, while another defines its agenda 
in opposition to arguably a caricature of his key terms such as “aesthetic form” and “disinterest.” 
 
Plato. “Phaedrus.” In Complete Works. Edited by J. M. Cooper, 506–556. Indianapolis, IN: 
Hackett, 1997. 
Also see Philebus (pp. 398–456), Symposium (pp. 457–505), Laws (pp. 1318–1616). As an 
ancient Greek philosopher of the 4th century BCE, many of Plato’s ideas on beauty reverberate 
down through the centuries. That appreciation of beauty requires cultivation, not in appearances 
but in our concepts of appearances, and that we respond to the higher forms of beauty, not with 
pleasure but with love without desire, exemplifies contemporary understanding reminiscent of 
Plato. 
 
Plotinus. Enneads. Translated by A. H. Armstrong. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1966. 
Living in the 3rd century, Plotinus provides an example of the way Plato’s ideas were translated 
into mystical theologies. Plotinus translates Plato’s “Form” into a sign of the presence of God or 
the One. When we apprehend beauty, we are each partaking of the mind of God. 
 
Scarry, Elaine. On Beauty and Being Just. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999. 
Provides an example of a contemporary formalist theory of beauty in the original sense of 
“formalist.” The focus on form provides a means by which to identify an aspect of pleasurable or 
life-reaffirming engagement with the world based on an aspect other than satisfaction of appetite 
or personal gain. 
 
Tatarkiewicz, Wladyslaw. The History of Aesthetics. Vol. 1–2. The Hague: Mouton, 1974. 
Divided into three volumes, the first two cover ancient and medieval aesthetics, respectively. It 
provides a useful way of grounding the philosophical interest in beauty in a wider philosophical 
context. Beauty named a way of orientating oneself to the world and was a guide to what was 
worth knowing, doing, and loving. 
 
Beauty and Evaluation 
The original conception of beauty as form that involved establishing a link between our appetites 
and our morality was set aside in much early-20th-century writing on aesthetics in order to focus 
upon evaluative categories for art criticism. Art/music/literary theorists develop what is arguably 
a new notion of artistic form that is sometimes mistakenly interpreted as having derived from 
earlier accounts, sometimes turning the earlier conceptions into caricatures in the process. The 
notion of significant form, for example, in Bell 1914 and doctrine of music as tonally moving 
forms in Hanslick 1957 were categories devised to guide art and music appreciation for its own 
sake. Collingwood 1958, however, apparently alert to this equivocation on form, focuses instead 
on the imaginative component of aesthetic form that to some extent develops an idea from Kant 
that would reveal our engagement in art as a symptom of our human agency (as opposed to mere 
affect), a thought that Collingwood furthers in his distinction between amusement and art. 
Greenberg 1961 attempted to shift our mind-set away from the limitations of conceiving of art as 
representation. The work argued that the picture inhabits the same order of space as our bodies, 
and as such, the artwork is an object in its own right rather than a copy or imagined equivalent of 
something else. Beardsley 1981 develops a different line of thought, simply reasoning that the 
difference between art and nonart is in virtue of aesthetic form. It identifies the various elements 
of aesthetic form across the various media, including visual art, music, performance, and 
literature. Levinson 1996 can be understood as developing this idea further by factoring in 
contextual elements. It identifies relationships of dependence and mutual involvement among a 
comprehensive set of properties of the artwork. Langer 1953 conceived of the relevant form as 
objectified feeling. Langer developed what has been called structural expressionism, according 
to which artistic form is structurally isomorphic with the nature of emotional experience. 
Differences in aesthetic appraisals between individuals and groups were meant to be explained 
rather than settled by clarifying the nature of aesthetic form. Peter Kivy has argued that in order 
to understand any aspect of art including form, one should focus on a particular art medium as 
he believes there is no generic sense of form applicable to all art media. Kivy 1997 focuses upon 
music. Yet others, like Moran 2012, discuss beauty’s form in terms of its particular form of 
normative requirement which does apply to all art media. 
 
Beardsley, Monroe. Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism. 2nd ed. Indianapolis: 
Hackett Publishing, 1981. 
Elements of aesthetic form applicable to a range of art media including visual art, literature, and 
music are identified, respectively. Experiential elements contribute to a conception of aesthetic 
form that is actively constructed by the perceiver. Also provides a comprehensive coverage of 
topics in the analytic tradition prevalent in the mid-20th century. 
 
Bell, Clive. Art. London: Chatto & Windus, 1914. 
Argues that the representational content of art is irrelevant to its beauty. Proposes that a person 
appropriately sensitive and cultivated simply perceives the relevant aspect of art that Bell calls 
“significant form.” He treats this form as independent of context and culture. He argues that 
reality reveals itself through pure form. 
 
Collingwood, Robin G. Principles of Art. London: Oxford University Press, 1958. 
Develops a nuanced theory of beauty and aesthetic form that could be understood as updating 
Kant’s aesthetic theory. Collingwood retains a sense that our engagement in art proper 
demonstrates our agency (free will or morality). Imagination is the key rather than perception. 
He presents his theory as a guide to art criticism. 
 
Greenberg, Clement. Art and Culture: Critical Essays. Boston: Beacon, 1961. 
Argues that as art requires firsthand experience as opposed to testimony or principles, this points 
to the different status of art to representational forms of communication. Art does not re-present 
anything. It consists of presentation, pure and simple. Each artwork is a new object in the world, 
not a copy of something else. 
 
Hanslick, Eduard. The Beautiful in Music. Edited by Morris White and translated by Gustav 
Cohen. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1957. 
Hanslick was a music critic who treated musical form as analogous to the curved lines of 
painting and sculpture, referring to the “primordial law of ‘harmonic progression’” to which we 
have access through our “mental vision.” Philosophically undeveloped, but nonetheless a good 
example of the evaluative category that aesthetic form became. 
 
Kivy, Peter. Philosophies of Arts: An Essay in Differences. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997. 
Discusses some similarities and differences between the possibility of abstraction and form 
perception in visual and auditory perception. He discusses whether it is possible to perceive the 
visual as an array of visual elements apart from what the elements represent, whereas such 
abstract perceiving, he argues, is a great deal easier where music is concerned. 
 
Langer, Susanne. Feeling and Form: A Theory of Art. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1953. 
Treats artistic form as the vehicle for the communication of feeling, effectively explaining how 
rational deliberation is necessary for artistic expression. However, she does not account for 
variations in perceptions regarding which forms are isomorphic with which emotions. 
 
Levinson, Jerrold. The Pleasures of Aesthetics: Philosophical Essays. Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1996. 
Presents a complex formalism, according to which aesthetic qualities are constituted by the 
relationships of dependence and mutual involvement among a comprehensive set of properties 
of the artwork, including vehicle (observable structure), content (specific qualities and 
meanings), historical setting, and context. 
 
Moran, Richard. “Kant, Proust, and the Appeal of Beauty.” Critical Inquiry 38.2 (2012): 298-
329. 
Moran provides an account of the normative force of beauty illustrated by examples. He explains 
what it feels like, drawing examples from Proust’s writing, and shows the sense in which it 
places demands upon others. He outlines the norm of responsiveness which he argues is prior to 
the other conditions for a correct judgment that is contained in the idea of beauty. These 
conditions imply ways to fall short in one’s response or evaluation. 
 
Beauty and Aesthetic Form 
The most philosophically committed of formalist theories of beauty do not conceive the relevant 
form as an objective property of the object. Aesthetic form is not a perceptual given but instead 
involves a judgment. In Gasche 2003, aesthetic form is understood as a deployment of 
perceptual processes such that no determinate interface between perception and cognition 
results. Guyer 1997 provides an interpretation of Kant’s notion of aesthetic form according to 
which the apprehension of it amounts to a second-order perception where the concept one 
applies determines what is noticed in the object and hence whether the perception of the object 
gives rise to an experience of the imaginative unity of aesthetic form. Allison 2001 argues that 
aesthetic form refers to the imaginative ordering of an object’s features, a form of reflection that 
is not so much a second-order perception but one that certain objects facilitate in primary 
perception. Lorand 2000 focuses on the perceptual principles of aesthetic form to distinguish it 
from logical form. Rancière 2006 suggests that the apprehension of meaning in art (implicitly in 
virtue of aesthetic form) necessarily involves a dialogical process in which one compares one’s 
apprehension of the object in principle or in practice with others to ascertain whether one’s 
configuring of the elements is optimal for the context in question. This interaction involves the 
communication of feeling both between artist and viewer and between viewers, the latter 
relevant to nonart objects and nature. Such processes represent an alternative basis for rational 
communication. In a similar vein, Nussbaum 1990 argues that to develop the right description or 
configuration of an event for ethical reflection involves the cultivation of empathy for the 
perspective of the other. The judgment required in the very way one describes or configures the 
event implicates aesthetic form. Adorno 1999 argues that aesthetic form refers to the uncovering 
and creation of new ways of conceiving experience unrestrained by entrenched and unexamined 
modes of thought that necessarily restrict the linguistically constituted thought. This is the idea 
that experience is not exhausted by linguistically grounded concepts and hence there is 
something else to be communicated such as rationally structured feeling. These characteristics of 
the communicative capacity of art inspire an interest in the aesthetic in the work of many later 
socially oriented philosophers, such as Habermas 2011, where aesthetic form is sometimes 
invoked to explain how new conceptions of experience can emerge; or in Tinguely 2018 where 
aesthetic form is invoked to explain how any kind of conception of experience is possible at all. 
 
Adorno, Theodor. Aesthetic Theory. Translated and edited by Robert Hullot-Kentor. London: 
Athlone, 1999. 
In a difficult and dense text on first reading, Adorno argues that aesthetic form provides a means 
to critique and transcend established patterns of value and knowledge in virtue of being 
nondiscursive but nonetheless communicative due to its inner consistency and relation to other 
aesthetic forms. 
 
Allison, Henry E. Kant’s Theory of Taste: A Reading of the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment. 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001. 
According to Allison, Kant limits what counts toward beauty in an object to formal properties (p. 
120). The formal properties of the object when apprehended as purposive correlate with the 
harmony of the faculties, which is pleasurable and hence prolongs itself. This is a controversial 
point among prominent Kant commentators. 
 
Gasche, Rodolphe. The Idea of Form: Rethinking Kant’s Aesthetics. Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2003. 
Gasche defends the view that aesthetic judgment is noncognitive. He explains that the processes 
normally involved in structuring perceptual data for the purposes of cognizing objects are 
redeployed in aesthetic judgment such that no concept of the object is forthcoming. 
 
Guyer, Paul. Kant and the Claims of Taste. 2d ed. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 
1997. 
The key concept of Kant’s aesthetic theory is the harmony of the faculties, and “the form of 
purposiveness” is a placeholder for whatever is capable of occasioning such harmony. All kinds 
of properties of objects might be relevant to “the form of purposiveness” according to Guyer’s 
well-supported and coherent interpretation of Kant’s aesthetics. 
 
Habermas, Jürgen. “Modernity versus Postmodernity.” In The Continental Aesthetics Reader. 
2nd edition. Edited by Clive Cazeaux, 297–306. London and New York: Routledge, 2011. 
Written in 1980, this paper argues that the inner logic of the aesthetic allows for the development 
of new concepts from aspects of old or already entrenched concepts. This is relevant to 
satisfying the universal shared conditions of communication between groups and cultures. Also 
in the volume, a useful summary of Habermas’ interest in the aesthetic is provided by the editor 
(pp.295-297). 
 
Lorand, Ruth. Aesthetic Order. London: Routledge, 2000. 
Defines and develops a conception of aesthetic form in opposition to logical form. Lorand 
presents a useful analysis of the difference between the kind of information, and the method of 
conveying it, of the two kinds of form. 
 
Nussbaum, Martha. Love’s Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1990. 
Demonstrates the notion of aesthetic form (even though this is not the term used by Nussbaum) 
as opposed to discursive or logical form, with Nussbaum arguing that ethical questions require a 
consideration of context rather than the application of universal moral principles and that 
literature plays a central role in ethical reflection. 
 
Rancière, Jacques. The Politics of Aesthetics: The Distribution of the Sensible. London and New 
York: Continuum, 2006. 
The categories of thought are constructed through and by the institutions with which we interact 
directly or indirectly through our communities. The political implications of this are explored, 
but it is the possibility of such constructions that demonstrate the nature of aesthetic form. 
 
Tinguely, Joseph J. Kant and the Reorientation of Aesthetics: Finding the World. New York and 
London: Routledge, 2018. 
By comparing various historical accounts on the relation between communicative interests, 
sentiment and perception, including Aristotle and Kant on rhetoric and judgment, and Hume and 
Rousseau on dispositions and passions, it is argued that a conception of aesthetic form emerges 
that is central to our capacity for reconfiguring perceptions and impressions, one purpose of 
which might be to address conflicts which are not resolvable by the discursive procedures 
normally considered optimal for such purposes. 
 
Beauty and Autonomy 
The ways in which beauty is considered autonomous are many. It might be autonomous in that 
what one considers relevant to an object’s beauty has no relation to what the object is, its 
function, and its political or ethical status, as Bell 1914 asserts. This view is rare in philosophical 
writing, but those like Stolnitz 1960 that hold it, falsely attribute it to historical figures in the 
absence of other forms of support. Conversely for those that use the position as a foil to their 
own theories, the questionable historical link provides surrogate support. For example, Carlson 
2008 sets up its alternative position as an improvement on Kant’s aesthetic theory. Another 
sense of autonomy and one that more accurately characterizes historical work in aesthetics, is 
that judgments of beauty proper do not involve inference from premises to conclusion and, as 
such, beauty judgments are autonomous in this sense from the logic underpinning propositional 
and categorical logic. This is the view of autonomy found in Kant, and in relation to which he 
proceeds to defend universality (Kant 1987). A related but historical materialist account of 
autonomy is found in Adorno and Marcuse, according to whom the autonomy of aesthetic 
judgment pertains to art’s independence from the entrenched and institutionalized conceptual 
frameworks that underpin discursive language. The idea is that the aesthetic form of art offers an 
alternative form of communication (Adorno 1999, Marcuse 1979). However, it is important to 
note that just as Kant neither argues nor implies that the aspects of the object relevant to 
judgments of beauty are independent from moral, political, or ethical concerns and consequences 
(Guyer 2008), the same can be said of the historical materialists. It was in virtue of aesthetic 
form that art could provide insight, and as such, art’s autonomy referred to its being able to 
escape the constraints of literal language rather than escape literal concerns. Any reflection on 
the kind of engagement in objects and events that characterize human culture would demonstrate 
the error of separating beauty from the ethical dimension, as aptly demonstrated by the papers in 
Hagberg 2008. Autonomy is equated with rationality in Bradley 2015 where pleasure and moral 
development figure in the nature of judgments of beauty. 
 
Adorno, Theodor. Aesthetic Theory. Translated and edited by Robert Hullot-Kentor. London: 
Athlone, 1999. 
Argues that sensibility and perception have a history as the concepts through which we notice 
aspects of experience are replete with the meanings we internalize through our interaction with 
various social institutions. Aesthetic form is the only vehicle that provides an opportunity in 
human beings for genuine invention. Originally published in 1970. 
 
Bell, Clive. Art. London: Chatto & Windus, 1914. 
Beauty is found in formal properties narrowly conceived according to Bell’s aesthetic 
hypothesis. This is the position that has served many philosophers of art well by providing a foil 
to their own position. The second part of Bell’s thesis called the metaphysical hypothesis is 
rarely referred to, as it takes on a more Schopenhauerian position. 
 
Carlson, Allen. Nature and Landscape: An Introduction to Environmental Aesthetics. New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2008. 
Carlson interprets Kantian aesthetics to imply that beauty is grounded in aspects of the distal 
array humans register as unified only in the compositional sense. Against this conception of 
formal beauty, Carlson develops his content-rich notion of environmental beauty. 
 
Guyer, Paul. “Is Ethical Criticism a Problem? A Historical Perspective.” In Art and Ethical 
Criticism. Edited by Gary L. Hagberg, 3–32. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2008. 
Points to where in Kant’s text one can find support for the view that theories of beauty in the 
18th century did not treat the aspects of the object relevant to perceptions or experiences of 
beauty independently from the object’s moral or functional significance. 
 
Hagberg, Gary I., ed. Art and Ethical Criticism. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2008. 
A collection of papers that demonstrate the moral import of what we experience as beautiful, 
expressive, moving, excellent, perfect, ethically insightful, or whatever one would name that 
experience once endorsed as beautiful. 
 
Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Judgment. Translated by W. S. Pluhar. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 
1987. 
Aesthetic autonomy refers to the fact that aesthetic judgment does not involve an inference from 
premise to conclusion. It does not proceed by proofs. Its rational foundation does not translate 
into propositional or literal linguistic form. Originally published in 1790. 
 
Marcuse, Herbert. The Aesthetic Dimension: Toward a Critique of Marxist Aesthetics. London: 
Macmillan, 1979. 
Argues that through the beauty of aesthetic form we are able to apprehend experience in 
revolutionary ways. The very presence of art in the world acts as critique on social conventional 
forms of thinking, and art is by definition, according to Marcuse, aesthetic form. 
 
Murray, Bradley. The Possibility of Culture: Pleasure and Moral Development in Kant’s 
Aesthetics. West Sussex: Wiley, 2015. 
Murray grounds the rationality of aesthetic judgment in the constraints imposed by culture on 
the individual. A notion of aesthetic autonomy can be seen to be demonstrated in the freedom 
that aesthetic judgment so conceived, makes possible. 
 
Stolnitz, Jerome. Aesthetics and Philosophy of Art Criticism. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1960. 
Presents a concept of disinterested perception on which he grounds the concepts of aesthetic 
disinterested contemplation and disinterested attitude for which his main support is arguably a 
misrepresentation of various 18th-century philosophers on beauty. 
 
Beauty and the Form of Perfection 
A concept of beauty found in medieval Arabic and Persian philosophy, according to Gonzalez 
2001, is that our concept of what the object is meant to be defines the outlines against which our 
estimation of the object’s perfection is evaluated, and this perfection constitutes beauty. A theory 
of beauty as perfection also characterizes the rationalist tradition as discussed by Beiser 2009, 
particularly in relation to the aesthetic theory of Christian Wolff. Wolff believed that the 
pleasure of beauty is intentional rather than a mere sentiment. This intellectually grounded 
notion of beauty continues in the philosophy of Hegel who conceived of beauty as ontological 
perfection, the notion that beauty is a quality possessed by those things that are what they are 
meant to be (Hegel 1975). In this sense, beauty as perfection is closely linked to beauty as 
utility. Guyer 2005 compares 18th-century British accounts of beauty as utility with German 
accounts and locates Kant’s views on beauty in relation to both. A very recent and more prosaic 
version of beauty-as-perfection is presented by Stephen Davies who argues that beauty is 
equated with utility in the sense that we perceive the form of the object relative to what we know 
the object to be, which includes what we know of the object’s purpose or function. This notion 
of beauty can be reduced to a mere formula if the indeterminacy of aesthetic form is not fully 
appreciated. Davies does not lose sight of this, when he writes, for example, “Aesthetic 
considerations constrain the manner in which the primary function is to be pursued, while the 
nature of the primary function is relevant to determining what aesthetic effects should be aimed 
at” (Davies 2006, p. 238). This functional version of beauty-as-perfection also has an ancient 
pedigree in Plato’s report of Socrates’s views in The Republic: “And we judge the excellence, 
beauty and rightness of any implement or creature or action in relation to the use for which it 
was made, by man or nature” (Book 10, p. 601, in Hofstadter and Kuhns 1976). This is echoed 
in Aristotle where he considers the beauty of a man relative to his occupations as dictated by his 
particular time of life (Rhetoric, Book I, p. 1361b, in Hofstadter and Kuhns 1976). Many 
accounts include aspects of functional beauty, such as Armstrong 2004 and Sircello 1975. 
 
Armstrong, John. The Secret Power of Beauty. London: Allen Lane, 2004. 
In Chapter 2, Armstrong presents a very elegant case for and against the functional account of 
beauty, using examples to illustrate his arguments. 
 
Beiser, Frederick C. Diotima’s Children: German Aesthetic Rationalism from Leibniz to 
Lessing. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. 
A very useful resource for a sympathetic study of aesthetic theories in German Rationalism that 
presents an interesting account of various influences on Kant, in some cases influences he may 
have tried to overcome. However, it falls into rather clichéd formalist interpretations of Kantian 
aesthetics. 
 
Davies, Stephen. “Aesthetic Judgments, Artworks and Functional Beauty.” Philosophical 
Quarterly 56.223 (2006): 224–241. 
Davies presents a philosophically interesting account of beauty according to which the concept 
we have of an object determines what we notice in an object and hence what aspects contribute 
to the configuration we perceive as a candidate for beauty. 
 
Gonzalez, Valerie. Beauty and Islam: Aesthetics in Islamic Art and Architecture. London: I. B. 
Tauris, 2001. 
A fascinating study of the theories of beauty developed by medieval Persian and Arabic Muslim 
philosophers. A study of how the ideas of Persian, Arabic, Muslim, Latin, Christian, and Jewish 
philosophers intermeshed during the medieval period is useful for understanding the ideas on 
beauty of the Early Modern philosophers. 
 
Guyer, Paul. “Beauty and Utility in Eighteenth-Century Aesthetics.” In Values of Beauty: 
Historical Essays in Aesthetics. Edited by Paul Guyer, 110–128. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005. 
A very useful comparison of the ideas on beauty as utility in Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Berkeley, 
Burke, Hume, Leibniz, and Wolff; with the last part of the chapter occupied with relating Kant’s 
ideas on adherent beauty and teleology to the idea of beauty as utility. 
 
Hegel, G. W. F. Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art. Translated by I. M. Knox. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1975. 
Written between 1835 and 1838, Hegel was reluctant to acknowledge a foundational role for 
nonconceptual processes such as feeling or pleasure. Hegel considers the goal of everything to 
be perfection. The goal-oriented nature of self-awareness is fundamentally conceptual according 
to Hegel and hence beauty is also conceptual, namely, perfection. 
 
Hofstadter, Albert, and Richard Kuhns. Philosophies of Art and Beauty: Selected Readings in 
Aesthetics from Plato to Heidegger. London: University of Chicago Press, 1976. 
An excellent selection of extracts from key ancient and historical texts on beauty, providing an 
overview of the conception of beauty of each author by drawing attention to the various works in 
which they wrote on beauty. Extracts from Plato and Aristotle quoted in the preceding 
commentary. 
 
Sircello, Guy. A New Theory of Beauty. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975. 
Develops a theory of beauty that includes as one of its key criteria that a property cannot count 
toward beauty if it is experienced as a deficiency in relation to the object’s nature, function, or 




When the value of beauty is associated with genius and innovation, the structure of aesthetic 
judgment becomes the focus. Donald Crawford reminds us that according to Kant’s “Critique of 
Aesthetic Judgment,” cognition involves matching newly formed representations with what we 
already know, to see whether to discard the new or alter the entrenched (Crawford 1974, pp. 84–
89). Judging beauty, however, is not like this. As Guyer 2006 points out, judging beauty 
involves a second-order perception comprised of having a perceptual (unified) experience to 
which one then seeks to apply a concept. It is not like an ordinary cognition (or arguably a first-
order perception) where the concepts you already have more or less determine what you can 
notice and your attention remains focused upon literal content. Shaviro 2009 argues that in a 
reflecting judgment, the possibility of innovation and creativity is opened up because affect or 
feeling rather than the concept drives the process. Matthews 1997 considers the implications of 
this aspect of reflecting judgment for creativity in the scientific domain, while Savile 1987 
considers the role of aesthetic ideas in imaginative engagement. Guyer 1993 points out that an 
aesthetic judgment involves identifying certain relations between perceptual or conceptual 
aspects. To this extent Crawford concurs, “Aesthetic merit or beauty is itself a relation” 
(Crawford 1974, p. 169). Kant argues that reflecting judgment is nonetheless communicable 
even though what actually constitutes the judgment is a feeling rather than a subsumption of 
elements under classes and categories. When one judges beauty, one’s judgment is “regarded as 
an example of a universal rule that we are unable to state” (Kant 1987, 5:237). Hence, aesthetic 
judgments as reflecting judgments are communicable and, as Shaviro 2009 points out, always 
contestable. This aspect draws out another theme associated with aesthetic judgment that is its 
ethical or social function. From the discussion of Aristotle on tragedy in Nussbaum 1986, we 
might conclude that aesthetic judgments manifest as feelings about objects that we nonetheless 
treat as judgments about the objective nature of the object. This draws us into communication 
with our peers to ascertain the grounds of variations between our judgments because we treat 
them as though there is a fact of the matter. As Guyer points out (Guyer 2006, p. 329), according 
to (Kant 1987, 5:306), aesthetic judgments demonstrate that our sensuous selves can be oriented 
toward rational ends, in virtue of certain kinds of interactions within our communities. And 
Kneller 2018 analyses these interactions in terms of the imaginative reflective activity which has 
a social significance.  
 
Crawford, Donald. Kant’s Aesthetic Theory. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1974. 
By analyzing the key terms of Kant’s theory of aesthetic judgment—“harmony of the faculties” 
and “aesthetic ideas”—in terms of spatial-temporal qualities and Locke’s secondary qualities, 
respectively, Crawford provides a more dispositional treatment than found in most 
commentators on Kant’s aesthetics. 
 
Guyer, Paul. Kant and the Experience of Freedom. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 1993. 
A collection of essays that offer an interpretation of aesthetic reflecting judgment according to 
which the autonomy of aesthetic judgment is a demonstration of the human being’s agency. 
Guyer addresses the crucial question concerning how Kant connects sensibility with morality 
that involves a capacity linked to creativity and genius. 
 
Guyer, Paul. “The Beautiful, Sublime, and Morally Good.” In Kant. Edited by Paul Guyer, 307–
333. London: Routledge, 2006. 
In a very useful analysis and discussion of Kant’s aesthetic theory, Guyer locates Kant’s 
concepts of beauty and the sublime within Kant’s broader concerns concerning moral motivation 
and community. 
 
Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Judgment. Translated by W. S. Pluhar. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 
1987. 
This is the seminal text in philosophical aesthetics. The concepts and variables that continue to 
define what can be debated concerning the nature of aesthetic judgment are set out in this text. 
This particular translation balances literal translation with contemporary formulations. Other 
excellent translations are Meredith, and Guyer and Matthews. 
 
Kneller, Jane. “Aesthetics and Communication.” In Social Aesthetics and Moral Judgment: 
Pleasure, Reflection, and Accountability. Edited by Jennifer A. McMahon, 213-224. New York 
and London: Routledge, 2018. 
While aesthetic pleasure resulting from imaginative reflective activity is fundamentally personal, 
it is also communicable. This activity produces and sustains itself, but also aims to be shared 
with others. An analogy is drawn between the features of this kind of reflective judgment in the 
role such judgments play in social development; and their role in the development of social 
cohesion in culturally diverse communities. The occasion for the latter can be reflective 
judgments about art. 
 
Matthews, Patricia. The Significance of Beauty: Kant on Feeling and the System of the Mind. 
Boston: Kluwer Academic, 1997. 
Argues that the disinterested, universal aspect of our aesthetic liking indicates a human being’s 
ability to judge from an enlarged perspective, from the point of view of everyone else, and 
leaves the mind in a state of reflection conducive to making connections and indicating where in 
nature order is to be found. 
 
Nussbaum, Martha. The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and 
Philosophy. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1986. 
Explores the relation of emotion and cognition in reflective responses to literature and drama, 
through the discussion of examples, particularly ancient Greek tragedy. 
Savile, Anthony. Aesthetic Reconstructions: The Seminal Writings of Lessing, Kant, and 
Schiller. Oxford: Blackwell, 1987. 
In an interesting interpretation of Kant’s aesthetic theory, Savile analyzes the nature and 
significance of Kant’s doctrine of aesthetic ideas for creative and imaginative conceptions of the 
self in relation to the world. 
 
Shaviro, Steven. Without Criteria: Kant, Whitehead, Deleuze, and Aesthetics. Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 2009. 
An examination of aesthetic reflecting judgment, which compares the concepts of experience 
(individual events) and feeling in the thought of Alfred North Whitehead with comparable 
concepts of experience (continuous) and feeling in Gilles Deleuze. Aesthetic judgment is given a 
pivotal role in understanding the human orientation to knowing and judging. 
 
Aesthetic Judgment and Community 
Hume 1987 explores the possibility of shared aesthetic values or taste among members of a 
community. This interest in shared aesthetic values and community drives authors like Friedrich 
Schiller (Schiller 1982). He believes that while “survival needs drive the individual into society” 
and “rational deliberation implants within her the principles of social behavior,” an appreciation 
of beauty motivates the cultivation of social character within the individual. How this plays out 
in practice might involve a community’s involvement in a range of cultural activities. For 
example, according to Gadamer 1986, the communicative dimension of festivals demonstrates 
the communicative dimension of art and beauty that relies on an active construction of meaning. 
Gadamer draws our attention to the constraints on our understanding played by tradition and 
experience. He acknowledges that taste is partly inherited through traditions and in part 
constituted by the community that exercises it. Furthermore, according to Kneller 2011, the 
formal structure of aesthetic judgment as identified by Kant involves reflection that broadens the 
mind to entertain possibilities beyond one’s own goals. Kneller argues that aesthetic judgment 
can be understood as an appropriate kind of judgment for facilitating communication between 
those who hold different cultural beliefs. In a similar vein, other works such as O’Neill 1992 
draw attention to the emphasis that Kant puts upon the comparative dimension of aesthetic 
judgment, intersubjectivity, and his notion of Sensus Communis in the third critique. According 
to Hampshire 1989, aesthetic judgment involves the process whereby we cultivate habits of 
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the aesthetic aspect of the political. 
 
Schiller, Friedrich. On the Aesthetic Education of Man: In a Series of Letters. Edited and 
translated by Elizabeth M. Wilkinson and L. A. Willoughby. Oxford: Clarendon, 1982. 
In letter 27, written in 1795, Schiller points out that the pleasures of the senses and of the 
intellect are individual pleasures and, as such, might set us against each other. However, through 
engagement in community we can realize our freedom because it is only then that personal 
interests cease to be our master. 
 
Beauty Motivated 
According to Plato, the sensuously beautiful seduced us onto a path that eventually revealed 
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adoration, such as the Indian rasa reported by Coomaraswamy 1918 to inspire love and devotion 
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accounts reduce the action or relation to compulsion. On the one hand, the discussion of 
aesthetic value in McDowell 1983 suggests that beauty names an experience a person might 
have of the world when freely conceiving of it as something of which he or she would want to be 
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support realism, the analyst will postulate objective aesthetic properties while a Neopragmatist 
might treat moral functionalism, as envisaged by Jackson and Pettit 1995, as an analogy for 
aesthetic functionalism, where the “realism” of aesthetic qualities might refer to their efficacy 
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There are many ways to naturalize a theory of beauty. Appeals to evolutionary theory often 
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